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The Price equation (see Price, 1970) is central to the book. Frank favours this
formulation because it gives “an exact, complete description of evolutionary change
under all conditions,” that is, because it is extremely general. Price asks us to consider
a population of entities that are grouped by their score on some trait z. Note that
the entities could be genes, individuals, groups or whatever, and z could of course
be anything at all. But let’s suppose that the entities are individual animals, and z
represents their degree of aggressive behaviour. Each possible value of z is paired with
a ﬁtness value, w; for example, z = 100 might be associated with w = 2, which might
mean, say, that highlyaggressiveanimals tended to have two offspringon average. The
population evolves in discrete generations, and the proportion of animals among the
offspringgeneration that have a particular z-value is equal to the proportionof animals
with the same value in the parental generation, multiplied by the relative ﬁtness level
w/w associated with it. So if 5% of the parents have a z-value of 100, the associated
ﬁtness score w is 2, and the average ﬁtness overall is 1, then 5% × 2
1 = 10% of the
offspring will have z = 100. If we look at how the average value of z, denoted by z,
will change over time, it turns out that:
w∆z = Cov(w,z) + E(w∆z) .
This is the Price equation, and it means that the average change per generation in
mean aggression, ∆z, will be equal to the covariance between ﬁtness and aggression,
Cov(w,z), plus the expected change in z during genetic transmission from parent to
child, weighted by ﬁtness, E(w∆z), all divided by mean parental ﬁtness, w. (I have
duplicated the way Frank presents equations, with what would have been the lone term
in a right-hand-sidedenominator—inthis case, w—groupedon the left hand side. This
mayseemstrangeat ﬁrst, but it saves spaceandmakesforcleaner-lookingtypography.)
The covariance term states the relatively obvious: if there was a positive relationship
between aggression and ﬁtness in the parental generation, the mean value of aggres-
sion among the children will go up; if a negative relationship, it will go down. The
second, expectation term is often ignored by other authors, because it is assumed that
genetic transmission may be noisy but is, on average, reliable, and therefore the ex-
pected change in z from parent to offspring will be zero. But it is clear that this term
maybe non-zero(e.g.,if mutationis biased)andcanthus affectthe courseofevolution.
Frank develops a great deal from this simple beginning. He begins by recursively
expanding the Price equation to look at higher levels of selection: the covariance term
then describes selection among groups, while the expectation term describes selection
within groups and other factors. Space precludes listing all of the ways in which the
ideas are developed, but some highlights for adaptive behavior researchers might well
be Frank’s treatment of the differing effects of large and small mutations (chapter 5),
andthe effectsofdemographyandspatialdispersalas theyrelatetokinselection(chap-
ter 7). Sex allocation—the question of how much to invest in sons and how much in
daughters—is used throughout the book as an example problem.
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